Tuesday, May 20, 2025

Peter Lax, 1926-2025

As I noted just last month, DTLR does not dwell on mathematics very much, but a second exception seems just as warranted as my earlier post last month.  Today we learn of the passing of Abel Prize laureate Peter D. Lax (1926-2025), a retired professor at the Courant Institute at NYU, last Friday.  He was a highly accomplished pure and applied mathematician, who worked in the field of partial differential equations, and on numerical methods for their solution.  Much of this work has direct relevance to applied physics and engineering, including fluid dynamics.

Prof. Lax is also the only Abel Prize winner I have ever met in person.  It was just a brief meeting during a visit I made to the Courant Institute in the late 2000's on other business.  We did not exchange many words, but I was honored to meet him.

I've attended lectures by at least two other Abel Prize winners, S.R.S. Varadhan and the late John Nash, but did not meet them face to face.

I'll take this chance to mention my encounters with winners of the other major international prizes in mathematics.  As far as I know, I have neither met nor attended lectures by any of the Fields Medalists, except for Shing-Tung Yau.  As for the Wolf Prize in Mathematics, both Lax and Yau are the only ones I've personally encountered as noted.  Well, it must be evident that I don't attend math conferences or math lectures very often.


Wednesday, May 14, 2025

Bad philosophy or just an urge for glory?

I haven't read many of Carlo Rovelli's works, but I did enjoy an essay he published this month in Nature.  "There is a healthy sense of crisis in fundamental physics" he says, but he is dismayed by commonly seen demands for physics "beyond" the standard model, conventional quantum theory, and general relativity.  He thinks this is because of "bad philosophy" or mis-readings of philosophers of science such as Kuhn and Popper, who he claims are understood to endorse radical "overthrows" of existing theories and treating all speculative theories equally seriously until they've been falsified.  He argues that previous "paradigm shifts" are actually more "conservative" than commonly understood, and that despite this, radical new theories are driven primarily by confronting data not currently understood, as well as apparent contradictions among different pieces of knowledge.

It is a good and thought-provoking essay.  I basically agree with his point that the history of science is far more methodologically valuable to study than philosophy of science.  However I surmise that he's overthought the explanation for the craze for "physics beyond the standard model" (such as supersymmetry and string theory).  I think the more radical alternatives just have greater potential for scientific glory than more "conservative" approaches (such as loop quantum gravity, a field he worked in and seems to think is a "proof of concept" for an approach more closely tied to existing quantum theory and gravitational theories, though he points out some of its "radical" features).  Thus, the appeal of following the wilder approaches is the chance to attain heroic status.

I haven't summarized Rovelli's essay very eloquently; he writes very well and I recommend reading it.  Even though his should not be the final word (I'm certainly not convinced that the wilder speculative theories should be completely abandoned) but it's a good counterpoint to much of what we read, especially in accounts of popular physics.